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Age Discrimination in Employment: The Scope of
Statutory Exceptions to the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA)I was
enacted to protect older workers from arbitrary employment prac-
tices, such as the establishment of age requirements unrelated to
the ability needed for a job, and to meet the problem of increasing
numbers of older workers who are unable to retain employment after
job displacement.2 The ADEA, in language similar to the employ-
ment practices sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,1 prohibits
an employer from discriminating against any employee or applicant
for employment who is between forty and sixty-five years of age
because of such person's age. Specifically, the employer may not
discharge or refuse to hire any such individual because of his age,
nor discriminate against him with respect to the compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of his employment.4
There are also broad exceptions to the Act. The ADEA establishes
three defenses to otherwise unlawful acts of age discrimination 5 by
providing that it is lawful for an employer: (1) to discharge, demote,
or transfer an employee, or refuse to hire a prospective employee
where age is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably nec-
essary to the normal operations of a particular business,6 or where
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1970 & Supp. IV 1974).
2. In its statement of findings and purpose, Congress succinctly summarized the problems
of the displaced older worker when it found that: (1) in the face of rising productivity and
affluence, older workers find themselves disadvantaged in their efforts to retain employment,
and especially to regain employment when displaced from jobs, (2) the setting of arbitrary
age limits regardless of potential for job performance has become a common practice and
certain otherwise desirable practices may work to the disadvantage of older persons, (3) the
incidence 9f unemployment, especially long-term unemployment with resultant deterioration
of skill, morale, and employer acceptability is, relative to the younger ages, high among older
workers; their numbers are great and growing, and their employment problems grave. Id. §
621(a).
3. Congress debated the inclusion of a prohibition against age discrimination in the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-15 (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-
17 (Supp. IV 1974), but settled on directing the Secretary of Labor to investigate the problems
of the older worker and to make recommendations of appropriate legislation, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-14 (1970). See Hearings on Age Discrimination Bills Before the Subcomm. on Labor of
the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 29, 35 (1967). The
Secretary's report documented the exercise of widespread and arbitrary age discrimination
in employment and led to the passage of the ADEA of 1967. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, REPORT TO
THE CONGRESS ON AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT (1965).
4. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621, 623 (1970).
5. Id. § 623(f).
6. Id. § 623(f)(1).
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differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than age, (2) to
retire or refuse to hire an employee pursuant to the terms of a
legitimate seniority system or employee benefit plan that is not a
subterfuge to evade the purposes of the Act,7 or (3) to discharge or
otherwise discipline an individual for good cause.'
This article examines the scope of ADEA defenses to age discrimi-
nation suits to determine to what extent and under what circum-
stances an employer may discriminate on the basis of age. The
article focuses on policies, regulations, and interpretations of the
ADEA by Congress and the Department of Labor. In addition, the
discussion includes an examination of federal courts' constructions
of ADEA defenses.
AGE DISCRIMINATION AND THE BONA FIDE OCCUPATIONAL QUALIFICATION
In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,9 the Supreme Court held that the
defense of business necessity would be allowed when an employ-
ment practice that operated to exclude a class of individuals could
be shown to be job-related. The ADEA explicitly recognizes the
defense of business necessity and permits an employer, labor organi-
zation, or employment agency to make certain discriminations
based upon age if age is a bona fide occupational qualification
(bfoq) reasonably necessary to the normal operation of a particular
enterprise. 10
The bfoq defense stems from section 703(c) of Title VII, which
provides that it shall not be an unlawful practice for an employer
to discriminate on the basis of religion, sex, or national origin in
those instances where religion, sex, or national origin constitutes a
valid occupational criterion." In the context of Title VII, the bfoq
defense is of limited applicability. Title VII does not define bfoq and
the EEOC in its interpretive regulations has construed the defense
narrowly. Asserted primarily in sex discrimination cases, the bfoq
defense does not apply to race discrimination and is rarely used as
a defense to national origin or religious discrimination."2
Judicial and legislative construction of bfoq under the ADEA has
been similarly restricted. The ADEA gives the Secretary of Labor
7. Id. § 623(f)(2).
8. Id. § 623(f)(3).
9. 401 U.S. 424 (1971); see Comment, Washington v. Davis: Splitting the Causes of Action
Against Racial Discrimination in Employment, 8 Loy. Cm. L.J. 225, 226-27, 231-33, 242-45
(1976).
10. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1970); see 29 C.F.R. § 860.102 (1975).
11. See W. CONNOLLY, A PiRAcIcAL GUIDE TO EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY, 558 (1975).
12. Id.
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statutory authority to issue rules and regulations and to establish
reasonable exemptions from any provisions of the Act as he might
find necessary and proper in the public interest. 3 Pursuant to that
authority, the Secretary has provided
that this concept of a bona fide occupational qualification will
have limited scope and application. Further, as this is an exception
it must be construed narrowly, and the burden of proof in estab-
lishing that it applies is the responsibility of the employer, employ-
ment agency, or labor organization which relies upon it."4
These regulations also include illustrations of possible bfoq's. Ac-
cording to the interpretations promulgated by the Department of
Labor, the statutory exemptions of bfoq's are limited to compulsory
age limitations for hiring or retirement without reference to the
individual's actual physical condition at the terminal age, when
such conditions are clearly imposed for the safety and convenience
of the public such as mandatory retirement schemes for airline pil-
ots. 5 In addition, bfoq's may include age requirements for actors
when particularly youthful or elderly characterizations are needed"6
and situations where the employee is used to promote or advertise
the sale of products designed for and directed to appeal exclusively
to either youthful or elderly customers. 7
These narrow interpretations of bfoq have been substantially fol-
lowed by the courts, but the decisions have created a somewhat
broader exception. The basic principle against class-based assump-
tions of inability was asserted to reject an age-based bfoq for bus
drivers. In the first test of this exception, the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida upheld a bus company's
practice of refusing to consider applicants over a certain age for
employment as drivers. 8 The Secretary of Labor in Hodgson v.
Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc. ,"g sought to enjoin the company's refusal
to employ extra board drivers forty years of age or older. Extra board
13. 29 U.S.C. § 628 (1970). The Secretary of Labor has delegated enforcement of the
ADEA and the power to issue interpretations to the Wage, Hour, and Public Contracts
Division of the Department of Labor. 33 Fed. Reg. 129 (1968).
14. 29 C.F.R. § 860.102(b) (1975).
15. 29 C.F.R. § 860.102(d) (1975). See Age Requirements for Pilots, Wage-Hour Adminis-
trator Op., July 5, 1968, [Current] FAir EMPL. PRAC. MAuAL (BNA) § 401, at 5203; 14 C.F.R.
§ 121.383(c) (1976).
16. 29 C.F.R. § 860.102(e) (1975).
17. Id.
18. Hodgson v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 4 Emp. Prac. Dec. 6047 (S.D. Fla. 1972), aff'd,
Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976); see Note, The Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act of 1967, 90 HARv. L. REv. 380, 405-10 (1976).
19. 4 Emp. Prac. Dec. 6047, 6048 (S.D. Fla. 1972).
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drivers are those individuals who have insufficient seniority to bid
for regular routes. They are on call twenty-four hours per day, seven
days per week, filling in for regular drivers, charters, and unsched-
uled trips on a first in, first out basis.20
The employer testified that forty was a valid cut-off point in light
of the rigors of extra board duty, which in the long run could not be
safely undertaken by older persons. Without becoming specific, the
district court stated that evidence has shown that functional age,
as distinguished from chronological age, could not be determined
with sufficient reliability to meet the safety obligations of motor
carriers.2 The court reasoned that the limitations and requirements
of the company's seniority system together with the extraordinary
stamina, flexibility, and adaptation associated with extra board
work justified an age requirement to ensure the continued safe oper-
ation of the business. 2
An Illinois federal district court reached an opposite conclusion
in Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc.,23 where the defendant refused
to consider applicants between the ages of forty and sixty-five for
the position of interstate bus driver. The company produced evi-
dence suggesting that newly hired drivers over thirty-five were more
likely to be involved in accidents than drivers hired at a younger
age.24 The court held that Greyhound failed to meet its burden of
proving that age was a bfoq. While recognizing the foremost concern
for public safety, the court felt that functional capacity and not
chronological age should be the primary factor in determining
whether an individual could perform a job safely .2
This decision was subsequently overturned by the Seventh Cir-
cuit one year later. 26 In reversing the judgment for the plaintiff, the
20. Since the seniority system in Tamiami operates even within the extra board, the
driver may not have the privilege of selecting a particular extra board since any other driver
with more seniority can select that particular run. Thus, extra board drivers with relatively
low seniority are inevitably relegated to the most difficult extra board runs and locations.
21. 4 Emp. Prac. Dec. 6051 (S.D. Fla. 1972). The court concluded that the employer need
not deal with each applicant over 40 years of age on an individual basis by considering his
particular functional ability to perform safely the duties of a driver if it was not practical to
do so. Id., at 6050. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1(a)(ii) (1976), wherein the EEOC mandates that
the principle of nondiscrimination requires that individuals be considered on the basis of
individual capacities and not on the basis of any characteristics generally attributed to the
group. See also Note, Age Discrimination in Employment, 50 N.Y.U.L. REv. 924, 929-30
(1975).
22. Id. at 6048.
23. 354 F. Supp. 230 (N.D. I1. 1973), rev'd, 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1122 (1975).
24. 354 F. Supp. at 231-32.
25. Id. at 239; see Note, Constitutional Attacks on Mandatory Retirement: A
Reconsideration, 23 UCLA L. REv. 549 (1976).
26. 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974).
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court of appeals considered inapplicable the standard set by the
lower court that the employer must show a factual basis for believ-
ing that all or substantially all applicants over the age of thirty-five
would be unable to perform the duties safely and efficiently. In the
case of bus drivers, the court reasoned that concern must go beyond
the welfare of the job applicant to include consideration for the well-
being of bus passengers and highway motorists.27
According to the court, the appropriate standard was whether the
bus company could demonstrate that it had a rational basis for
believing that the elimination of its maximum hiring age would
increase the risk of harm to its passengers. 28 The court regarded as
persuasive the company's evidence relating to the rigors of work
assignments and expert medical testimony showing the degenera-
tive physical and sensory changes brought on in humans by the
aging process. Moreover, statistical evidence demonstrated that the
company's safest bus drivers were those between the ages of fifty
and fifty-five with sixteen to twenty years of driving experience. 29
The Seventh Circuit concluded that such evidence vindicated a
maximum age hiring policy based upon a good faith judgment with
respect to the safety of the passengers. In neither Tamiami nor
Greyhound did the bus companies establish a maximum age beyond
which a driver was not permitted to work.
Apparently, the Fifth Circuit in Tamiami adopted a test of a bfoq
set forth in Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone Co., 30 a Title VII sex
discrimination case in which the court stated that in order to rely
on the bfoq exception, an employer must prove that he had reasona-
ble cause to believe that all or substantially all women would be
unable to perform their duties safely and efficiently. However, the
Seventh Circuit in Greyhound31 held that the burden of proof test
to be applied was not that of the Fifth Circuit's Weeks decision but
rather that of the same court in Diaz v. Pan American Airways.32
Here again, a Title.VII sex discrimination case established prece-
27. Id. at 861.
28. Id. at 863.
29. 354 F. Supp. at 236-37; 499 F.2d at 864-65.
30. 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969).
31. 499 F.2d at 862.
32. 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971). In Diaz, Pan American Airlines was charged with a
violation of the 1964 Civil Rights Act because of its refusal to hire male flight cabin attendants
solely because of their sex. Pan American argued that being female was a bfoq for the position
of flight cabin attendant because females were superior in performing nonmechanical aspects
of the job, and could better cater to the psychological needs of passengers. The court rejected
Pan American's basis as being merely "tangential to the essence of the business involved."
442 F.2d at 388.
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dent. Diaz held that the standard of proof required to support a bfoq
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of a particular enter-
prise is a business necessity test rather than a business convenience
test.13 Because Greyhound contended that the hiring of older drivers
would endanger the lives of its passengers, the court found that a
maximum-age hiring limit was clearly a question of business necess-
ity. The court then proceeded to interpret Spurlock v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 34 which had upheld the airline's educational and train-
ing requirements for flight officers, 35 as reducing the burden on an
employer to demonstrate the job relatedness of his employment
criteria where the economic and human risks of hiring unqualified
applicants were great. Because the same risks were involved in
Greyhound, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the defendant need
only show a rational basis for believing that the elimination of its
maximum hiring age would increase the risk of harm to its passen-
gers.
The bus driver cases are probably applicable to any job where
sudden illness presents a substantial safety risk to the employee,
fellow employees, or the general public. Examples might well be
truck drivers, pilots, firemen, police officers, and steeplejacks. 31
Moreover, the rationale behind maximum-age hiring limitations
may apply equally to the establishment of mandatory retirement
ages in discharge situations 7.3  The involuntary retirement of an
employee does not violate the ADEA where the employer was moti-
vated by reasonable factors other than age. If age enters the em-
ployer's decision to fire an employee, the ADEA is violated unless
there exists good cause for the discharge. No precise and unequivo-
cal determination can be made pertaining to the scope of the phrase
"differentiation based on reasonable factors other than age."
33. 442 F.2d at 388. The business necessity test is not synonymous with business conveni-
ence. Both the EEOC and the courts have emphasized that it is not enough for a business to
show that a class was excluded simply because that was the best and easiest way of doing
business. Before any such discrimination can be practiced, it must not only be shown that
hiring a class is impractical, but also that the hiring policy is absolutely essential to the
business, not merely tangential. See generally United States v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry.
Co., 464 F.2d 301 (8th Cir. 1972); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1971).
34. 475 F.2d 216 (10th Cir. 1972).
35. Id. at 219-20. The plaintiff in Spurlock alleged a discriminatory impact in the defen-
dant's minimum requirements, including 500 hours of flight time, a commercial pilot's license
and instrument rating, and a college degree. The impact of the college degree requirement
was mitigated by the waiver of this qualification if the applicant's other qualifications were
superior.
36. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 860.102, 860.103; see note 15 supra.
37. See generally Wilson v. Sealtest Foods, 501 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1974); Hodgson v.
Earnest Mach. Prod., Inc., 479 F.2d 1133 (6th Cir. 1973); Stringfellow v. Monsanto Co., 320
F. Supp. 1175 (W.D. Ark. 1970).
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Whether such differentiation exists must be decided on the basis of
all the particular facts and circumstances surrounding each individ-
ual situation."
DISCRIMINATION BY REASONABLE FACTORS OTHER THAN AGE
Among the reasonable factors other than age that an employer
may consider, the Department of Labor cites physical fitness re-
quirements reasonably necessary for the work to be performed,39
quantity or quality of production, 0 the results of employment test-
ing, educational levels validly related to specific job requirements
and consistently applied to persons of all ages," and a uniform
policy against hiring the relatives of present employees. 2 Thus, a
differentiation based on a physical examination, but not on age,
may be recognized as legitimate in jobs where strict physical re-
quirements contribute to the safety of the individual employees or
in occupations that are particularly hazardous by nature: ironwork,
bridge building, demolition, and other jobs calling for rapid reflexes
or a high degree of speed, coordination, dexterity, endurance, or
strength. 43
However, a claim for differentiation will not be permitted on the
basis of an employer's assumption that every employee over a cer-
tain age will become physically unable to perform the duties of the
job." Surveys of employer attitudes have shown that employers tend
to stereotype the older worker as being less productive due to declin-
ing physical ability, more likely to be involved in costly on-the-job
accidents, more prone to absenteeism, generally deficient in work
skills, and possessed of negative attitudes toward their work. 5 In
contrast to this stereotype, research in industrial gerontology has
consistently disclosed that there is more variation in the ability of
workers in the same age group than there is between age groups, and
therefore, the ability of any worker to render an acceptable job
performance cannot accurately be assessed solely by reference to his
chronological age. 8 Thus, in many instances a person at age sixty
may physically outperform another individual of thirty.
38. 29 C.F.R. § 860.103(b) (1975).
39. Id. § 860.103(f)(1)(i).
40. Id. § 860.103(f)(2).
41. Id.
42. Id. § 860.104(c).
43. Id. § 860.103(f)(1)(ii).
44. Id. § 860.103(f)(1)(iii).
45. See Note, Age Discrimination in Employment: Correcting a Constitutionally Infirm
Legislative Judgment, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 1311, 1315-16 (1974).
46. Id. at 1316.
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The Secretary of Labor will not accept a general assertion that the
average cost of employing older workers is higher than the average
cost of employing younger workers unless a statutory exemption
applies.47 An employer who classifies employees solely on the basis
of age in order to compare costs assumes that age alone may be used
to justify a differentiation-an assumption plainly contrary to the
terms of the ADEA and the purpose of Congress in enacting it."
The scope of the "reasonable factors" exception was first tested
in Stringfellow v. Monsanto Co. 50 After economic necessity required
the employer to reduce the extent of its chemical plant operations,
the plant manager requested the superintendents of the mainte-
nance, manufacturing, and personnel departments to submit evalu-
ations of their employees' work performance based on certain cri-
teria. These evaluations dictated continuation or termination of
employment. Nearly all terminated employees were over forty. The
discharged employees contended that the method of selection, al-
though based on performance evaluations, resulted in age discrimi-
nation. However, the district court found that the evaluation plan
resulted in discharge under a method of differentiation based on
reasonable factors other than age.5 The court reasoned that the
terminated employees were given an explanation for their dismissal
and an opportunity to review the evaluations.52 The court also noted
that the employer attempted to diminish the economic impact of
discharge by establishing a placement program and by exploring
transfer possibilities through inquiries to other facilities.5 3
The reasonable factors exception was further defined by the fed-
eral district court in Bishop v. Jelleff Associates.54 In Jelleff the
court held that despite the inclusion of the employee's age as one
factor in the company's decision to terminate the employee, the
ADEA was not violated because the employer demonstrated that
the discharge was actuated by reasonable factors other than age. In
that case, a retail women's speciality store, after leaving its down-
town location in favor of an outlying area, initiated a sales policy
designed to appeal to a younger clientele and simultaneously re-
duced the number of its employees in order to cut expenses. The
47. 29 C.F.R. § 860.103(h) (1975).
48. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (b) (1970). See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
49. 29 U.S.C. § 623(d), (f) (1975).
50. 320 F. Supp. 1175 (W.D. Ark. 1970).
51. Id. at 1180-82.
52. Id. at 1181.
53. Id. at 1180.
54. 7 Emp. Prac. Dec. 7041 (D.D.C. 1974).
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court found that the employer did not violate the ADEA with re-
spect to all employees between the ages of forty and sixty-five whose
employment was terminated after the store's new sales policy went
into effect.55 However, the court did find that the policy had resulted
in individual unlawful discharges." Dividing the terminations into
three basic categories-resignations, discharge for cause, and termi-
nations pursuant to the policy of reduced personnel-the court con-
strued the bfoq defense as permitting discharges not only for cause
but whenever premised upon a rational business decision made in
good faith and not influenced by age bias. 7 Under this construction,
an employer would be able to lay off employees because of adverse
business conditions or discharge a company officer or executive
whose business views or abilities disaffected management.
For example, in Gill v. Union Carbide Corp.,58 an employer suc-
cessfully proved that an employee had been dismissed because eco-
nomic considerations compelled a reduction in the work force. Each
employee had been evaluated as to ability, effectiveness, versatility,
and other performance-related considerations developed by man-
agement. The performance evaluation applied to all employees in-
volved in the reduction regardless of age, but a provision gave pref-
erence for job retention to employees over forty. The employer cre-
ated a procedure to review evaluations. The court dismissed the
plaintiff's action, concluding that the performance evaluation cri-
teria were proper and that the employer had applied them conscien-
tiously."
A contrary result was reached in Schultz v. Hickok Manufactur-
ing Co.,10 where the employer unsuccessfully attempted to justify
the termination of a salesman on the ground that he should have
done more business. In light of testimony by the plaintiff that he
had been informed he was being discharged to make room for a
younger man, statistical evidence which showed that the average
age of salesmen had dropped thirteen years since the defendant had
assumed control of the business, and the employer's failure to im-
peach the witnesses' testimony, the court rendered a judgment for
55. Id. at 7043. Because the reasons given for termination varied, the court found it
necessary to analyze each plaintiff's circumstances separately to determine whether any
individual was the subject of age discrimination. Since the court had to give each plaintiff
separate consideration, it did not find any basis for awarding class relief.
56. Id. at 7043-48.
57. Id. at 7049-50.
58. 368 F. Supp. 364 (E.D. Tenn. 1973).
59. Id. at 367-69.
60. 358 F. Supp. 1208 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
872 [Vol. 8
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the discharged employee that included reinstatement, back pay,
and attorney's fees."
Thus, through a straightforward defense premised on a conscien-
tious and good faith effort to use performance-related considera-
tions, a defendant employer may be able to rebut an employee's
allegations of age-based discrimination.
Although the federal regulations that allow a federal statutory or
regulatory limit of a bfoq do not discuss the efficacy of state
maximum-age regulations, there is strong indication that equal
dignity will be given to regulatory schemes of state or local govern-
ments. The United States Supreme Court in Massachusetts Board
of Retirement v. Murgial2 held it permissible for the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts to declare that medically fit state troopers were
nevertheless unfit legislatively to serve as policemen after they
reached the age of fifty. In Massachusetts, the primary function of
state police officers is to protect persons and property and to main-
tain law and order. Specifically, uniformed officers participate in
controlling prison and civil disorders, respond to emergencies, patrol
highways, investigate crimes, apprehend suspects, and provide
back-up support for local police. 3 The Court observed that these
arduous tasks required stamina and versatility leaving "few, if any,
backwaters available for the partially superannuated.""
Under the guise of an equal protection and due process rubric, the
Court found the statute clearly constitutional, since the state's clas-
sification rationally furthered the purposes identified by the state.6 5
61. Id. at 1217. The court discounted the fact that the average age of the salesmen
remained within the 40-65 age range protection of the ADEA, noting that the steep decrease
in the average age indicated that several salesmen within the protected age group were
replaced by men who were younger than the age group protected by the Act.
62. 376 F. Supp. 753 (D. Mass. 1974), rev'd, 427 U.S. 307 (1976). The question presented
in this case was summarily treated in Cannon v. Guste, 423 U.S. 918 (1976); Weisbrod v.
Lynn, 420 U.S. 940 (1975); aff'g 383 F. Supp. 933 (D.D.C. 1974); McIlvanie v. Pa., 415 U.S.
986 (1974), dismissing appeal from 454 Pa. 129, 309 A.2d 801 (1973).
63. 376 F. Supp. at 754; 427 U.S. at 310.
64. Id. Uniformed state police officers had to pass a comprehensive physical examination
biennially until age 40. After that, until the mandatory retirement age of 50, officers had to
pass a more comprehensive test. Officer Murgia had passed such an examination four months
before he was retired and there was no dispute that he was in excellent physical and mental
health when he was retired.
65. Ordinarily, the command of equal protection is only that the government must not
impose differences in treatment except for some reasonable differentiation fairly related to
the object of the regulation. This traditional scrutiny focuses solely on the legislative means.
Here, the courts do not demand a close fit between classification and purpose-judges are
prepared to allow legislators considerable flexibility to act on the basis of broad generaliza-
tions and to tolerate some overinclusiveness in classification schemes. See generally G.
GUNTHER, CONSTmTUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERLLS 657-65 (9th ed. 1975); Gunther, The
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The Court reasoned that through mandatory retirement at age
fifty the legislature sought to protect the public by assuring the
physical preparedness of its uniformed police. Because physical
ability generally declines with age, involuntary retirement removed
from police services those whose fitness for police work had
diminished. Thus, age was clearly related to the state's objective.
Though the state chose not to determine fitness more precisely
through individualized testing after age fifty, the objective of assur-
ing physical fitness was nevertheless rationally furthered by a
maximum-age limitation. Perhaps with respect to the interests of
all parties concerned, the state had not chosen the best means to
accomplish its purpose." However, where rationality is the test, a
state does not violate the equal protection clause merely because its
statutory classifications are imperfect. 7
Though the Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. obliged deference
to EEOC guidelines,6" in Murgia the Court displayed insufficient
appreciation of those guidelines. The EEOC has declared that the
reasonableness of differentiations based on factors other than age
should be determined on an individual case-by-case basis.69 Never-
theless, the Murgia Court chose to predicate its decision on a class
concept. Because Murgia made no claim under the ADEA,70 the
Court was able to neglect entirely the will of Congress as expressed
in the EEOC regulations. Were the Court confronted with an ADEA
action on similar facts, it would then need to deal with the congres-
sional purpose of promoting employment of older persons based
upon their ability rather than age.7 It is submitted that the rational
basis test should yield to legislative intent in such a circumstance.
THE BONA FIDE EMPLOYEE BENEFIT SYSTEMS EXEMPTION
The ADEA does not prohibit an employer, an employment
agency, or a labor organization from maintaining or observing the
terms of a bona fide employment benefit plan, Such as a seniority
Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court:
A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HA~v. L. REv. 1 (1972).
66. 427 U.S. at 316-17.
67. Id.; see Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
68. 401 U.S. 424, 434 (1971).
69. 29 C.F.R. §§ 860.103(b), (d) (1975).
70. Jurisdiction in Murgia was invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970), and declara-
tory and injunctive relief was sought under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202 (1970). The denial of equal
protection was alleged to constitute a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
71. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1970); see generally H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1967).
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system, retirement, pension, or insurance plan,72 so long as it is not
a subterfuge to evade the purposes of the Act.7" The words "bona
fide" are given their ordinary meaning in determining whether a
given plan falls within this exception to the ADEA.74 To be consid-
ered bona fide, a plan need not provide the same pension, retire-
ment, or insurance benefits to older workers as it provides to
younger workers, so long as any difference between them is in ac-
cordance with the terms of a bona fide plan.75 Rather, a plan provid-
ing unequal benefits to older workers complies with the Act if the
actual amount of payment made or cost incurred on behalf of an
older worker is equal to that made or incurred on behalf of a younger
employee." For example, an employer may provide lesser amounts
of insurance coverage to older workers under a group insurance plan
than he does to younger workers, provided the plan was not designed
to evade the purposes of the ADEA. Further, an employer may
provide varying benefits under a bona fide plan to employees within
the age group protected by the Act when such benefits are deter-
mined by a formula involving age and length of service require-
ments.77
Seniority Systems
In order to qualify as a bona fide seniority system eligible for
exemption from the requirements of the ADEA, the plan must have
length of service as the primary criterion for the equitable allocation
of employment opportunities among younger and older workers. A
seniority system may be qualified by such factors as merit, capacity,
or ability.79 It may operate on an occupational, departmental, plant,
or company-wide basis.'"
A seniority system that classifies, segregates, or otherwise dis-
criminates on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
will not be recognized as bona fide within the meaning of the
72. The list of plans that may be considered bona fide under the statute is not considered
to be exhaustive, but in order to be considered bona fide, a plan must be similar to the types
listed. See Brennan v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 500 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1974).
73. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1970).
74. Brennan v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 500 F.2d 212, 217 (5th Cir. 1974); Wage-Hour
Administrator Op., WH-138, June 29, 1971.
75. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(a) (1975).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. § 860.105(a).
79. Id.
80. Id.
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ADEA.81 Similarly, the adoption of a seniority system that gives
employees with longer service fewer rights and results in discharge
or less-favored treatment to those within the protection of the stat-
ute may be a "subterfuge" to evade the purposes of the ADEA. s2
Furthermore, any seniority system that perpetuates age discrimina-
tion existing prior to the effective date of the Act will not be consid-
ered bona fide under the Act."
It should also be noted that the Department of Labor believes
that the failure to communicate the essential terms and conditions
of an alleged seniority system to the employees it affects will dis-
qualify the system from an exemption to which it would be other-
wise eligible under the ADEA. 81
Employee Benefit Plans
Like seniority systems, employment benefit plans such as retire-
ment, pension, or profit-sharing plans may provide a reasonable
basis for differentiation based on age.1 The ADEA authorizes invol-
untary retirement irrespective of age provided that such retirement
is pursuant to the terms of a plan meeting the requirements. A plan
is bona fide if it is authentic and genuine, even though an employee
who elects to participate in it is shown only a summary of the plan
and not a full copy.86 The fact that an employer may decide to
permit certain employees to continue working beyond a stated age
in a formal. retirement program does not, in and of itself, render the
otherwise bona fide plan invalid.87 However, the Department of
Labor interprets the statute as forbidding pre-sixty-five mandatory
retirement of employees who are not participants in the employer's
retirement or pension program, and has secured judicial concur-
rence in this view.
In Hodgson v. American Hardware Mutual Insurance Co., 18a pen-
81. Id. § 860.105(d).
82. Id. § 860.105(b).
83. Id. The character of seniority systems under the ADEA has yet to be litigated. The
court in Chaudoin v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 6 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 107 (D.D.C. 1973), aff'd
sub nom. Carvey v. O'Donnell, 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 572 (D.C. Cir. 1974), never reached
the issue of the bona fide character of a seniority plan, ruling that the plaintiff's action was
barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel. Because the Federal Aviation Act vests exclu-
sive jurisdiction in the Civil Aeronautics Board with respect to challenges to the validity of
an integrated seniority list resulting from a merger of two airlines, the court felt that it had
no jurisdiction under the ADEA to hear the suit.
84. 29 C.F.R. § 860.105(c) (1975).
85. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1970); 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(a) (1975).
86. Brennan v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 500 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1974).
87. 29 C.F.R. § 860.110(a) (1975).
88. 329 F. Supp. 225 (D. Minn. 1971).
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sion plan requiring the retirement of male employees at sixty-five
and female employees at sixty-two was held to violate the ADEA
insofar as it permitted the employer to retire sixty-two year-old
employees who were not participants in the plan. The district court
rejected the employer's contention that it would be unreasonable to
discriminate between participants and nonparticipants, since the
pension plan met the conditions of the exception to the ADEA under
which the employer could observe the terms of a bona fide benefit
plan. The court noted that while the retirement of members was
compelled under the terms of the plan, retirement of nonmembers
occurred only at the employer's convenience." Though parochial
interests (such as the encouragement of plan membership) might
have been served by the discharge of nonmembers, the court
deemed that the overall economic interests of the country, as deter-
mined by Congress in prohibiting age discrimination, were overrid-
ing. 0 Moreover, the court stated that there was no conceptual dis-
tinction between an employer's imposing mandatory retirement
upon an employee at sixty-two and his refusing to hire a sixty-two
year old person because of his age.' The court dismissed the em-
ployer's contention that the retirement of all females at age sixty-
two, and not merely those who were members of the plan, was
required by the Internal Revenue Code.92 The Code provided that
the age of retirement under a pension plan, if less than sixty-five,
must comport with the age at which employees customarily retire
in the company or industry. The court determined that the Internal
Revenue Code and the ADEA are not in pari materia because the
purposes of the two acts are totally unrelated." The court concluded
that the tax regulation was intended to prevent employers from
using a very low retirement age to increase the annual tax deduction
for the employer's contribution to the retirement plan, and that
there appeared to be no conflict between that regulation and the
present retirement plan as lawfully put into effect.
Contrary to the arguments of the Secretary of Labor, the Fifth
Circuit has held that a plan providing for normal retirement at age
sixty justifies mandatory retirement at that age, even though such
89. Id. at 228.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 229.
92. 26 U.S.C. § 401(a) (1970).
93. The Internal Revenue Code is designed to raise revenue and § 401(a) in particular is
concerned with expensing by employers of their contributions to employee benefit plans. To
the contrary, the ADEA is designed to promote the employment of older workers. Thus,
although both the Code and the ADEA have provisions dealing with employee retirement
plans, the scope, direction, and reasons for the provisions are almost wholly unrelated.
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retirement is not designed as a cost-saving device."4 In Brennan v.
Taft Broadcasting Co.,95 a broadcasting station employee who at age
sixty offered to waive his benefits under a profit-sharing retirement
plan in exchange for a later retirement, but who was nevertheless
terminated in accordance with the plan schedule, was declared not
to have been discriminated against in violation of the ADEA. Under
the terms of the plan, employees were required to retire at age sixty
unless consent of the company for a later retirement date was ob-
tained.
The Department of Labor has not acquiesced in this decision. The
Brennan majority rested its decision on a reading of the "unambi-
guous language of the statute,"" thereby disregarding legislative
history and policy considerations that it conceded might support a
different conclusion. The Brennan court disposed of the "subterfuge
clause" in the statute by reasoning that since the defendant em-
ployer's retirement plan was effectuated before the enactment of the
ADEA in 1967, it could not act as a subterfuge. 7 This logic is uncon-
vincing because what is forbidden is not a subterfuge to evade the
Act, but a subterfuge to evade the purposes of the Act. These pur-
poses are articulated in the ADEA and speak to concerns older than
the Act itself:
It is .. .the purpose of this chapter to promote employment of
older persons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit
arbitrary age discrimination in employment; to help employers
and workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the im-
pact of age on employment.98
Thus, in order to qualify for the exemption to the ADEA, there
must be some reason other than age for a plan or a provision of a
plan that discriminates between employees of different ages. Any
other reading of the subterfuge clause would produce the absurd
result that an employer could discharge an employee pursuant to a
retirement plan for no other reason than age, but then could not
refuse to rehire the presumptively otherwise qualified individual
because the ADEA explicitly provides that no such employee bene-
fit plan "shall excuse the failure to hire any individual." 9
94. Brennan v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 500 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1974).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 217. A similar argument was considered and rejected in Braunstein v. Comm'r,
374 U.S. 65 (1963).
97. Id. at 215.
98. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1970).
99. Id. § 623(f)(2).
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According to the Department of Labor regulations, a profit-
sharing plan normally does not qualify for an exemption as a bona
fide employee benefit system under the ADEA 0° However, this type
of plan may constitute a bona fide exception where its primary
purpose is to provide retirement benefits for employees. 1 ' Still, an
employer's "thrift plan" was held by the Department of Labor not
to be entitled to an exemption from the ADEA where (1) it required
mandatory employee contributions, (2) its costs were not related in
any way to the age of participating employees, and (3) contributions
to the plan depended upon the amount of the company's profits and
the amount of payroll deductions authorized by the participants. 0 2
Since the plan limited employee eligibility to those between twenty-
five and sixty years old, and since a clause in the plan could be read
as requiring compulsory retirement for sixty-year olds who had at
least fifteen years of continuous service, the plan would violate the
ADEA.
DISCHARGE OR DISCIPLINE FOR GOOD CAUSE
Finally, under the ADEA the discharge or discipline of a covered
employee is not actionable when done for good cause." 3 The dis-
charge does not violate the Act if the employer was motivated by
reasonable considerations other than age.
It has been held that an action for an unlawful discharge in viola-
tion of the ADEA would be dismissed where from the evidence one
could reasonably conclude that an employer found an employee had
failed to fulfill satisfactorily the business responsibility assigned to
him. This decision was rendered by the Eighth Circuit in Surrisi v.
Conwed Corp.,'"' in which the plaintiff, who was fifty-two years of
age, failed to increase sales to the satisfaction of the employer. The
employer urged that the discharge was for good cause and not based
on age. In sustaining the employer's position, the court noted that
the ADEA is remedial in nature. It prohibits a subtle form of dis-
crimination, and the courts must be receptive to its purposes and
accord it the intended scope.' 5 The court further reasoned that
whenever an employment practice is challenged, the court should
100. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(b) (1975).
101. Id.
102. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1975). Opinion Letter of Wage-Hour Administrator Op., WH-
287, April 29, 1974.
103. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(3) (1970).
104. 510 F.2d 1088 (8th Cir. 1975).
105. Id. at 1090.
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not limit its inquiry to a particular department or branch of the
employer. 01
This defense was also successfully asserted in Brennan v. Rey-
nolds & Co., 07 where the employer was granted a motion for sum-
mary judgment to a complaint of age discrimination. The court
reasoned that where there were sufficient grounds for terminating a
receptionist, the employer's belief that a younger person would pres-
ent a better image would not diminish the lawfulness of the dis-
charge. Time sheets of eighteen months preceding the employee's
dismissal indicated that she had been late on 210 mornings. The
receptionist was warned twice that continued tardiness would result
in her discharge. The court found that any such evidence proved
beyond doubt that there was good cause for discharges under the
ADEA. 08 Though finding that the ground of tardiness was suffi-
cient, the court also stated that the ADEA did not require it to
determine whether a discharge for reason other than age was justifi-
able. Instead, the court intimated that the question was whether the
discharge was attributable to age alone. 09
Thus, the ADEA is concerned about age discrimination: its pur-
pose is not to solve other problems concerning employment. In ap-
proving discharge for good cause as a defense to an action under the
Act, it is not the court's purpose to label as "for good cause dis-
charge" any kind of termination other than one based merely upon
the age factor. The ADEA's statutory exceptions do not thrust upon
the court the duty of determining that the discharge was justifiable
for reasons other than age. It serves only to prevent discharge be-
cause of age alone. However, even when age is but one of a number
of reasons for discharge, the finding must be that the discharge was
not for good cause within the meaning of the Act. Otherwise, the
congressional intent of the statute would be defeated.
CONCLUSION
The ADEA prohibits age-based discrimination in employment,
yet Congress inserted a statutory exception that allows discrimina-
tion on the basis of age in certain circumstances.
When age is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of the business, employers, labor
organizations, and employment agencies may make certain age-
106. Id.
107. 367 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. 11. 1973).
108. Id. at 444.
109. Id.
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based discriminations that would otherwise be prohibited by the
Act. The phrase "bona fide occupational qualification" is a term of
art subject to narrow interpretation, and the Secretary of Labor
anticipates limited application on both federal and state levels.
Furthermore, the ADEA does not prohibit an employer from
maintaining or observing the terms of a bona fide employee benefit
plan so long as it is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of the
Act. The list of plans that may be considered bona fide in the
statute is not exhaustive, except that no such plan shall excuse the
failure to hire any individual.
Finally, by regulation, the discharge or discipline of a covered
employee is not actionable when done for good cause and for reasons
other than age.
Legislative interpretation and judicial construction of the
ADEA's statutory exceptions will help to balance the right of the
employee to equal employment opportunity and the employer's pre-
rogative to make decisions that he believes will maximize the profits
and efficiency of his business.
THOMAS S. MALCIAUSKAS
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